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INTRODUCTION
One of the great ironies of the modern world is the vagary of
public consciousness. For centuries, social norms and legal norms
worked together to build and patrol a nearly impregnable border
1
between the public and private spheres. Violent assault in the home
2
epitomized the separate treatment of these two worlds. There were
*

Associate Clinical Professor of Law, Boston College Law School; J.D., Harvard Law
School, 1977; B.A., University of Redlands, 1974. My thanks to Lynn Barenberg,
Instructor in Law and Social Worker, Boston College Legal Assistance Bureau, for
her insight into lawyer-client communication.
1. See Sally F. Goldfarb, Violence Against Women and the Persistence of Privacy, 61
O HIO S T. L.J. 1, 18-45 (2000) (analyzing the dichotomies of the private and public
spheres, namely the dichotomy between the market and the family, and the
dichotomy between the state and civil society, that are deeply embedded in American
law); see also Frances Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal
Reform, 96 HARV. L. R EV. 1497, 1520-24 (1983) (describing the legal history of private
and public spheres).
2. See Jane C. Murphy, Lawyering for Social Change: The Power of the Narrative in
Domestic Violence Law Reform, 21 HOFSTRA L. R EV. 1243, 1262 (1993) ( Under the guise
of protecting citizens from state interference in the private family sphere, common
law in this country permitted a husband to beat his wife, as long as the beating was
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laws that protected men on the streets, in their offices or in the
barroom from assault. And these laws were enforced. For women,
whose sphere of operation was primarily at home, there was no
protection from the kind of assault that was most likely to happen to
them. Domestic violence was rendered invisible. Women were
unseemly exhibitionists if they talked about family matters in public;
police and courts were voyeurs to look behind the closed doors of the
3
home.
In the last twenty years, much has changed. Violence in the home
is now well known in the publics consciousness.4 It is exploited in TV
shows such as Cops, condemned in newspaper editorials, recognized
by the courts and even given its own nom de guerre, Domestic
5
Violence  DV is the shorthand term used by advocates. However,
this very attention has rendered it invisible again. The sensationalism
6
has normalized violence. As a media savvy society, we see it but do
not excessive. ); see also Reva B. Siegel, The Rule of Love: Wife Beating as Prerogative
and Privacy, 105 Y ALE L.J. 2117, 2178-87 (1996) (examining the private sphere of the
home and how law served the patriarchy by defining domestic violence as beyond the
reach of law).
3. See Bradley v. State, 1 Miss. (1 Walker) 156 (1824) (addressing this policy
regarding domestic violence investigations).
However abhorrent to the feelings of every member of the bench must be
the exercise of this remnant of feudal authority [wife beating] . . . every
principle of public policy and expediency, in reference to the domestic
relations, would seem to require the establishment of the rule we have laid
down, in order to prevent the deplorable spectacle of the exhibition of
similar cases in our courts of justice. Family broils and dissentions cannot be
investigated before the tribunals of the country, without casting a shade over
the character of those who are unfortunately engaged in the controversy.
Id.; see also State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. (Phil. Law) 453 (1868) (emphasizing this policy);
State v. Black, 60 N.C. (Win.) 262 (1864) ( The law will not invade the domestic
forum or go behind the curtain. ).
4. See, e.g., Isabel Marcus, Reframing Domestic Violence: Terrorism in the Home, in
THE P UBLIC N ATURE OF P RIVATE V IOLENCE: THE DISCOVERY OF DOMESTIC A BUSE 11, 24
(Martha Albertson Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk eds., 1994) (indicating that, for
example, Buffalos domestic violence had risen to more than 20,000 domestic
violence incidents in 1992, and noting that the term  wife abuse was resurrected as
a  public, rather than  private, problem in the 1970s).
5. See Elizabeth A. Stanko, Fear of Crime and the Myth of the Safe Home: A Feminist
Critique of Criminology, in F EMINIST P ERSPECTIVES ON WIFE A BUSE 75-86 (Kersti Yllö &
Michele Bograd eds., 1988) (suggesting that the term  domestic violence may also
trivialize the horror of the reality of a home filled with terror, beatings and rape).
6. See Leslie G. Espinoza, Legal Narratives, Therapeutic Narratives: The Invisibility
and Omnipresence of Race and Gender, 95 MICH. L. R EV. 901, 915 (1997) ( The stories of
women who are traumatized by abuse are suppressed by the normalization of
violence toward women and children. ). Unfortunately, for many battered women,
the extreme media images of battered women prevent them from being identified as
battered. See Martha Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of
Separation, 90 MICH. L. R EV. 1, 25 (1991); see also BELL HOOKS, TALKING BACK:
THINKING F EMINIST, THINKING BLACK 87-89 (1989) (focusing on more extreme
domestic violence cases allows the public to ignore the more frequent, albeit less
extreme, cases of battering).
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not feel it. We talk in generalities about individual instances but do
not try to understand how they happened and what could be done to
stop it. Public consciousness is now blind in a different way.
7
The Dalton and Schneider book, Battered Women and the Law, is
important because it delves into the violence and forces us to a
different level of understanding. The book is a textbook that
challenges us to look beyond the superficial. By its mere existence,
the book is a critique. Why have the legal needs of battered women
been traditionally examined in a single class meeting only in criminal
8
law or family law class? We are battered women, and we have a right
to be visible. The history and legal issues dealing with battering are
9
central for a large proportion of the population.
The Dalton and Schneider book offers a clear vision of battering
10
that helps us understand how our society works for the powerless.
For example, it is simplistic to think of domestic violence law only
through the prism of public or private jurisprudence. The laws
regulation of safety and physical danger is a story of drawing lines to
protect the privileged parts of our society. Black men, gay men,
Chinese men, Mexican American men, and poor men all knew, and
know, that their social status as outsiders limited the protection
11
provided by law. Likewise, for poor working women, violent assault
12
happened not only in the home, but also in the public world. By
7. CLARE DALTON & ELIZABETH M. S CHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND THE L AW
(2001).
8. See Nancy Erickson, Sex Bias in Law School Courses: Some Common Issues, 38 J.
L EGAL EDUC. 101, 115 (1988) (noting that womens issues continue to be confined to
courses regarding women and the law).  In 1972, the AALS [Association of
American Law Schools] urged that the teaching of sex-based discrimination not be
confined to special courses but be diffused throughout the whole curriculum. Id.
9. See Patricia Tjaden & Nancy Thoennes, Extent, Nature, and Consequences of
Intimate Partner Violence: Findings from the National Violence Against Women Survey, N ATL
INST. OF JUST. iii (Natl Inst. of Just. & Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention eds.,
2000) (finding that approximately 4.8 million intimate partner rapes and physical
assaults are perpetrated against women annually in the United States), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/pubs-sum/181867.htm.
10. See DALTON & S CHNEIDER, supra note 7, at 132-207 (explaining carefully the
 dimensions of the battering experience). To understand battering, one must view
it in its many contexts, including homosexual relationships, that are marked by race,
culture and/or poverty that involve disabled persons. Id.
11. See R ONALD BARRI F LOWERS, MINORITIES AND CRIMINALITY 46-48 (1988) (noting
patterns of arrests of minorities for various offenses); CORAMAE R ICHEY MANN ,
UNEQUAL JUSTICE: A QUESTION OF COLOR 37-44 (1993) (using race as a factor to
analyze uniform crime reports); Floyd D. Weatherspoon, The Devastating Impact of the
Justice System on the Status of African-American Males: An Overview Perspective, 23 CAP . U.
L. R EV. 23-28 (1994) (addressing concerns of the devastating impact of the justice
system on the status of African American males).
12. See generally Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42
S TAN . L. R EV. 581 (1990) (describing how women of color have been subject to abuse
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examining the complexities and nuances of the battering, beating
and raping of women, Dalton and Schneider have given us a vehicle
to understand other invisible oppressions race, sexual orientation
13
and class.
14
Battered women are also invisible if they are  essentialized. Our
15
challenge is to understand patterns without missing differences.
This is difficult to do, especially for those on the front lines,
representing women in the high-pressure reality of protection orders.
Sometimes we get it right, but often we do not. This Paper is about
an actual case where I supervised a student attorney representing a
16
battered woman. It discusses our successes and our failures. Most
importantly, the Paper is about how much we learn from actually
working with women who are abused. As an activist lawyer, I was
and violence from outside their home). Generally, physical violence is an extension
of the domination of women of color. See BELL HOOKS, F EMINIST THEORY: F ROM
MARGIN TO CENTER 124-25 (1984).
[M]any black women feel they must confront a degree of abuse wherever
they turn in the society. . . . Black women in professional positions . . . are
often the targets of abuse by employers and co-workers who resent their
presence. Black women who work in service jobs are daily bombarded with
belittling, degrading comments and gestures on the part of the people who
have power over them. The vast majority of poor black women in this society
find they are continually subjected to abuse in public agencies, stores, etc.
These women often feel that abuse will be an element in most of their
personal interactions.
Id.
13. See DALTON & S CHNEIDER, supra note 7, at 132-33 (using a four factor
framework to discuss what differences racial, cultural, religious or socio-economic
distinctions make).
14. See Harris, supra note 12, at 588, 595 (noting that the feminist voice has been
the white feminist voice that purported to speak for all women); see Kimberle
Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against
Women of Color, 43 S TAN . L. R EV. 1241 (1991) (arguing that identity politics is
problematic in the context of violence against women because the violence that
many women experience is often shaped by other dimensions of their identities,
such as race and color). See generally Martha Minow, Feminist Reason: Getting It and
Losing It, 38 J. L EGAL EDUC. 47, 56 (1988) ( [F]eminists make the mistake we identify
in others the tendency to treat our own perspective as the single truth because we
share the cultural assumptions about what counts as knowledge, what prevails as a
claim, and what kinds of intellectual order we need to make sense of the world. ).
15. See Donna Coker, Enhancing Autonomy for Battered Women: Lessons from Navajo
Peacemaking, 47 UCLA L. R EV. 1, 11-12 (1999).
While battering is a phenomenon of gender subordination, it may also be a
function of racism, poverty, and conquest. If feminist anti-domestic violence
work is to be liberatory, it must recognize the importance of these
intersections in womens lives. Ignoring the importance of these oppressive
structures in the lives of battered women results in interventions that
ultimately fail the women whose lives are most affected by those structures:
poor women and women of color.
Id.
16. See MASS. S UP . JUD. CT. R. 3:03 (1994) (stating that students in Massachusetts,
as in most states, may act as a lawyer under the rules of the court).
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blinded by superficial understanding, congratulating myself on the
 good work I was doing, and moving on without really looking at
17
the woman I was representing. Despite our mistakes, this paper is a
call to continue our work. Representing battered women is an
ongoing project from which we continue to learn. The book we are
honoring today inspires us to continue the project along many
vectors gender, sexual preference, class, national origin, language
and race.
I.

V IOLENCE UNMASKED

Many of the women who seek legal help from our clinic suffer from
beatings, threats, humiliation and stalking, which all lead to
18
19
Our clinic is a branch legal services office.
tremendous fear.
These women come to us with a variety of legal problems, ranging
from restraining orders to evictions. I supervise the student attorneys
who represent these women, our clients. I work with three other law
professors, who are also supervising attorneys, and a full time social
worker.
In one instance, I had assigned a student to a case that seemed,
from the paperwork, ordinary enough. The client was seeking a oneyear restraining order and a divorce. The restraining order statute
requires that there be force or threat of force resulting in fear for
20
safety or sexual duress.
When the client came to our office, she had already been to court
and had obtained a temporary restraining order. As is usual, the
hearing was  ex parte, that is, her husband was not present. He
would be served with the ex parte order and receive notice that in ten
days he should appear and show cause why the temporary order
should not be extended for a year. The show cause hearing is usually
17. See Gerald P. Lopez, Reconceiving Civil Rights Practice: Seven Weeks in the Life of a
Rebellious Collaboration, 77 GEO . L.J. 1603, 1609-10 (1989) (arguing that the
relationship between lawyers and clients, where lawyers regularly dominate and
clients nearly vanish altogether, is a problem that all poverty lawyers need to
confront); see also Lori Nessel & Kevin Ryan, Migrant Farmworkers, Homeless and
Runaway Youth: Challenging the Barriers to Inclusion, 13 L AW & INEQ. 99, 138 (1994)
(explaining how an attorney representing poor clients may see herself as a  rescuer
and discount the clients intelligence, and ultimately take control of the case).
18. See A NGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATTERED WOMEN KILL 14, 65, 95-103 (1987)
(describing types of violence endured by battered women).
19. Boston College primarily funds the clinic, The Boston College Legal
Assistance Bureau ( LAB ). LAB also receives annual grants from the Greater
Boston Legal Services Corporation and acts as a branched, legal services office for
the communities of Waltham, Watertown and Newton, Massachusetts.
20. See Abuse Prevention Act, MASS. GEN . L AWS ch. 209A, § 1 (1978) (amended
1996); § 2 (amended 1983); § 3 (amended 1990).
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called a  10 day hearing. At the  10 day hearing, it was likely that
the clients husband would be present and would oppose extension
of the order. We indicated that we would help her at the  10 day
hearing, asking that the temporary order to be extended for one
21
22
year. We would then proceed with representing her in the divorce.
I usually think of the extension of the restraining order as
uncomplicated. In order to obtain the temporary order, the client
would have had to complete an affidavit and convince a judge that
there was a substantial likelihood that she could meet the standards
set out in the statute at the  10 day hearing. Thus, with a new
intake such as this case, I anticipated that all the hard work would be
in the divorce case itself.
This case, however, was different from the usual case. We could
not get the client to explain to us why she wanted the restraining
order. The client said she was very afraid of her husband. And she
seemed, in her presentation and affect, very afraid. We asked,  Did
he ever push you or shove you? Did he hit you? We asked a number
23
of different ways about physical force or threat of force. She said
she felt threatened but was not able to explain why.
In domestic violence cases, we have carefully created interview
24
protocols that are gender and situationally sensitive. I work with my
21. See § 2 (amended 1983) (allowing for a restraining order to be brought in the
District Court, Superior Court, Boston Municipal Court, or the Probate and Family
Court). The District Court has the power to extend the life of a temporary
restraining order after hearing after granting the defendant an opportunity to be
heard. See § 4 (amended 1990).
22. See ch. 215, § 3 (emphasizing that Probate Courts have exclusive original
jurisdiction over divorce actions). Once the action for divorce is filed, a protective
order can be requested pursuant to the divorce action. See ch. 209A, § 4. Filing in
the Probate Court provides the advantages of continuing the life of the temporary
restraining order during the pendency of the divorce (not having to be renewed as
in the District Court), and combining all matters in one action. See MASS. GEN . L AWS
ch. 208, § 28A (1994).
23. See MASS. GEN . L AWS ch. 209A, § 1 (1996) (including violence or the threat of
violence or sex under duress in the definition of abuse). The law does not address
emotional and/or psychological control and abuse. Id. Many of our clients indicate
that suffering from mental torture is worse than being beaten. Batterers create
mental anguish through various activities, such as disconnecting the telephone,
refusing to give any information about where they work or how much they make,
videotaping the client whenever she goes out, refusing to let her leave the house
alone, disabling the car, and insulting and harassing any of the clients friends.
There are no remedies in law for our clients for these behaviors. This is especially
true when the behaviors are not accompanied by physical violence or the threat of
violence that gives rise to a genuine fear for their physical safety. But see Catherine F.
Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered Women: An Analysis of
State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. R EV. 801, 869-73 (1993) (noting a few
states, thirteen in all, provide some level of protective relief from emotional abuse).
24. See L ENORE E. WALKER, A Response to Elizabeth M. Schneiders Describing and
Changing: Womens Self-Defense Work and the Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering, 9
WOMEN S R TS. L. R EP. 223, 223-24 (1986) (noting that  there is a fundamental
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students to develop questions and understand client reactions. We
consult with Lynn Barenberg, our social worker, to think through
what might be happening with the client and how to approach our
questioning. We know that if you ask a client,  Were you abused?
Did your husband beat you? , the response will often be  No.
However, the response may be different if we ask,  When you and
your husband had disagreements, what happened? , allowing the
client to explain. We might follow up with specific questions, such as,
 Did he push you, shove you or throw things at you? Did he hit
you with an open hand or closed fist? When we ask these
questions, we also explain why it is important to have a detailed
explanation of what happened. We then ask if we can share this
information with the court and we let the client know that their
batterer will be present.
As an office, we recognize that because some things are so difficult,
a client will not discuss the event or situation unless we provide an
opener. Here, we met again with the client seeking an extension of
her restraining order. The student and I tried every opener we knew,
but we were not able to help the client explain why she was afraid.
We were worried that the judge would not extend the order. The
clients husband was represented by counsel, and we were certain that
he would oppose the one-year order.
We knew we were missing crucial information. So we tried
something else. I sent the student attorney to the court to look at the
affidavit that the client submitted with the original order. It was hand
written, and the court had not given the client a copy of it when she
received the temporary restraining order. Reading the affidavit, it
became clear that the client was hinting at sexual abuse. It must have
been the judges ability at the original hearing to sense this that
motivated her to grant the temporary order. It also seemed that it
was easier for the client to write about the incidents rather than to
speak about them.
The student attorney worked to develop a careful, but direct
approach to ask the client about her fear of her husband. In
developing the plan, the student and I felt that it was important not
difference between the way women tell of their battering experiences and what is
permitted under the male-identified rules of evidence ). Women tend to tell events
by integrating patterns and emotions in the context of how the events happened. Id.
at 224. We now recognize that the narrow confines of a legal argument will usually
constrain the ability of a battered woman to explain what happened. Id.
25. See, e.g., L ENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 31-35, 174 (1979)
(documenting that battered women often suffer serious emotional and psychological
injury).
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to assume what we thought we were reading between the lines. In
our next meeting with the client, the student brought a copy of the
26
The student went over the bases for
restraining order statute.
granting restraining orders. The statutes definition of abuse
includes forcing sexual relations. The client now responded that this
was the behavior which she mostly feared. The statute opened the
door for the client to explain the basis for her real sense of terror
regarding her husband.
The client was still uncomfortable discussing the situation with us.
We asked her, if it was more comfortable, to write what had
happened. She said she would be more comfortable writing her
thoughts. The next day, the client brought to the student attorney a
ten-page history of her relationship with her husband and the
specifics of his reign of terror. He was a martial arts expert and
would use disabling martial arts techniques to force her to perform
degrading sexual acts. These would leave no physical bruises, and he
assured her that no one would ever believe her story that he forced
her to do anything.
Our office has worked hard to better communicate with and to
represent all of our clients. We have a special domestic violence
training program.27 Our goal is to expose our students to a variety of
techniques to communicate with their clients. We try to emphasize
that it is important not to generalize. We tell them, beware of the
trap of assuming your client will communicate in a particular way.
Every domestic violence client is different, and yet there are common
threads. Which thread will be common to any given client is not
clear until you meet with them and explore their communication
needs. In this case, we  got it. We facilitated the clients ability to
protect herself and to explain herself to the court. However, other
communication issues can be equally troubling.

26. See MASS. GEN . L AWS ch. 209A, § 1 (1996) (defining abuse as  the occurrence
of one or more of the following acts between family or household members: (a)
attempting to cause or causing physical harm; (b) placing another in fear of
imminent serious physical harm; (c) causing another to engage involuntarily in
sexual relations by force, threat or duress ).
27. The Womens Bar Foundation of the Womens Bar Association of
Massachusetts ( The Foundation ) provides pro bono representation for battered
women. The Foundation makes referrals, where appropriate, to our clinic and
conducts a training session for our students at the beginning of the semester. We
also provide materials on domestic violence to our students when they begin the
clinic.
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II. R ACE MASKED
A. Why Cant We Talk about Race?
Last April, I traveled down to Mexico to visit the little town where
28
my Nana  mi Abuela, my Grandmother was raised. My sister and
my two adult cousins, Ettie and Maya, were also on this mission. This
was a time when we were bonding, reconnecting to our roots, and
connecting with the persons we are now. The days were blissful,
almost magical, and then we started to talk about race.
My sister, Elise, told a story. By way of background, my sister and
her family live on an island north of Seattle. Her thirteen year old
son, Noah, goes to boarding school in Canada. Noah loves
basketball. My sister told us that Noah was very excited that the
school hired a new and wonderful basketball coach. Noah was
practicing basketball and emailing my sister. Some weeks passed and
my sister traveled up to Canada to see Noahs game. As the team
came out on the court, she saw the new basketball coach for the first
time. He is Black. Noah had not mentioned his race to my sister.
My sister was moved by this experience. There are only a handful
of African Americans on the island where Noah grew up. She felt the
sweetness, the innocence, of her son being able to relate to his new
coach outside the racial labels of our culture. Noah saw a person, not
a race.
This story, the story of my beloved, most Super-Nephew Noah,
drove me wild. I could not see or think about any of the individuals
involved. I only saw a  ruse for institutional colorblindness.  Well,
said I,  I wonder if the coach noticed he was Black. I went on,  In
that lily white area of Canada, in that basically lily white school, how
can you kid yourself that it is not racist to not notice. The coachs life
is defined by his race every hour of every day of his life. It is only
white privilege at work that allows some of us to notice race when we
want to and to not notice it if we dont want to. And here we are in
Mexico, visiting the town of our Nana, who never spoke English, who
was excluded and oppressed for being Mexican American. She never
had the privilege of not noticing she was Mexican.
By now my sister was nearly screaming at me. She had to, because I
was ranting and she wanted my attention.  How dare you impose
your theories onto peoples lives. You dont know what Noah
28. See Leslie G. Espinoza, Multi-Identity: Community and Culture, 2 V A. J. S OC.
P OLY & L. 23 (1994) [hereinafter Espinoza, Multi-Identity] (acknowledging the
influence my grandmother has had on my identity).
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thought or noticed. He only talked to me about what he saw as
important about his basketball team. And you dont know anything
about the coach and his life. You havent even been to visit the
school. You dont know what kind of racial mix there is. But
furthermore, what if Noah had said that his new coach is Black?
Would that make him racist or nonracist and who is judging? Are
you the judge?
29
Race is not a vague theoretical
It is hard to talk about race.
construct. It is a reality in all of our lives. It is deeply personal and
30
psychological. How do you understand the interaction between my
sister and me? Does it make a difference if you are a mother and
have tried to raise children to  do the right thing ? Does it matter if
you are Black or white? Does it matter that my sister is dark and looks
Mexican, and I am fair and no one ever thinks I am Mexican? Does it
matter that my sister chose to live in the country and to be an athome mother, and that I chose to be an academic and to think and
write about race all the time?
31
32
Racism is also social and political. We know it is pervasive. We
know it defines a world of haves and have nots. But it is almost
33
impossible to define. How do we know a persons race? It is about
color, but not only about color; it is about language and history and
culture, but not only about language, history and culture. There is a
hard truth and an impenetrable vagueness about race.
29. See Sharon Elizabeth Rush, Sharing Space: Why Racial Goodwill isnt Enough, 32
CONN . L. R EV. 1, 20 (1999) (providing an insightful and poignant description of the
difficulties of acknowledging race). White goodwill is a barrier in the sense that
[whites] are most comfortable not talking about race and succeed in
avoiding such discussions so long as the world operates under their view of
color-blindness. Correspondingly, they are less reluctant to talk about race
in instances where they believe the color-blind principle is violated, as they
think it is in affirmative action. . . . As most of White society relaxes in the
easy chair of denial, most of Black society is increasingly agitated about the
persistent inequality.
Id.
30. See Espinoza, Multi-Identity, supra note 28, at 23 (arguing that  American
society forces individuals to label themselves by race and gender).
31. See id. (discussing the social and political ramifications that result from the
categorization of race and gender that correlate to power).
32. See, e.g., R OBERT S TAPLES, INTRODUCTION TO BLACK S OCIOLOGY 250 (1976)
(pointing out that  [b]eing Black or White affects every element of individual
existence including access to jobs, education, housing, food, and even life or
death. ); CORNEL WEST, R ACE MATTERS 2-3 (1993) (explaining that race cannot be
seen as something that detracts from American life, but rather as an element that
constitutes a part of American life).
33. See MICHAEL O MI & HOWARD WINANT, R ACIAL F ORMATION IN THE UNITED
S TATES: F ROM THE 1960S TO THE 1990S 3 (1994) (explaining that  [e]veryone knows
what race is, though everyone has a different opinion as to how many racial groups
there are, what they are called, and who belongs in what specific racial categories ).
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B. The Need to Talk about Race
Should we talk about race? Is it an exercise of privilege to ignore
34
35
it? Is it an exercise of bias to acknowledge race? These are difficult
questions in our personal lives. They are questions that should not
be avoided in our professional lives. Lawyers, clients, judges, court
clerks, police, witnesses and defendants are all  raced. To different
36
degrees they notice their own and others races. With that noticing,
they incorporate their own knowledge, experience, beliefs and
37
suspicions into their work.
38
It is important for lawyers to learn to talk about race. I want to
propose an approach to race conscious lawyering structured around
developing narrative lawyering skills. The peril of  color-blind
34. See Barbara J. Flagg, Was Blind, But Now I See: White Race Consciousness and the
Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. R EV. 953, 973-74 (1993). Flagg states:
[W]hites rely on primarily white referents in formulating the norms and
expectations that become criteria of decision for white decisionmakers.
Given whites tendency not to be aware of whiteness, its unlikely that white
decisionmakers do not similarly misidentify as race-neutral personal
characteristics, traits, and behaviors that are in fact closely associated with
whiteness.
Id.; see also S TEPHANIE M. WILDMAN , P RIVILEGE R EVEALED: HOW INVISIBLE P REFERENCE
UNDERMINES A MERICA 5 (1996) (observing that society should focus on privilege, and
not just discrimination, when discussing racism and hierarchy because even though it
is pervasive, unlike racial distinctions, privilege goes unacknowledged and thus allows
the status quo to continue).
35. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part).
To pursue the concept of racial entitlement even for the most admirable
and benign of purposes is to reinforce and preserve for future mischief the
way of thinking that produced race slavery, race privilege and race hatred.
In the eyes of government, we are just one race here. It is American.
Id.
36. See O MI & WINANT, supra note 33, at 59.
One of the first things we notice about people when we meet them (along
with their sex) is their race. We utilize race to provide clues about who a
person is. . . . Our ability to interpret racial meanings depends on
preconceived notions of a racialized social structure. Comments such as,
Funny, you dont look black, betray an underlying image of what black
should be.
Id.
37. See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 S TAN . L. R EV. 317, 318 (1987) (recounting experiences in
which the author was reminded of his race and felt prejudiced because each
reminder held racial implications even though the intended spirit was one of the
shared humanity).
38. See Sue Bryant, The Five Habits: Building Cross-Cultural Competence in Lawyers, 8
CLINICAL L. R EV. 33, 38-48 (2001) (explaining that it is important to teach racial
awareness to law students so that when they become lawyers, they will be able to
understand cultural differences and better relate to their clients, who may come
from different cultural backgrounds).

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2003

11

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [2003], Art. 4
ESPINOZA-GARVEY_PKFINAL

298

5/13/03 2:22 PM

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL P OLICY & THE L AW [Vol. 11:2

lawyering pretending that race and racism do not exist is the lack
39
of justice for the objects of racism. Whites have the privilege to
40
pretend that racism does not exist; people marked by race know the
41
price for the insolence of pretending they are white. On the other
hand, the danger of race conscious lawyering is that we perpetuate,
indeed embody, racism. Is it possible to develop a way to lawyer with
42
nonracist, racial acknowledgement?
I believe that lawyering can be conducted in a way that creates
space for understanding outsider perspectives. Lawyers need to
develop cultural and race competencies. Other professions, such as
psychology and medicine, recognize the need to train professionals
43
The challenge is to keep cultural
to develop these skills.
44
understanding from becoming narrow-minded stereotyping. What
39. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. R EV.
1060, 1078 (1991) (claiming that colorblindness will not end the perpetuation of
racism, rather it will make it less alterable). In addition, colorblindness will impede
the progress of creating new cultural narratives that would lead to the achievement
of racial justice. Id.; see also Jodi David Armour, Color-Consciousness in the Courtroom, 28
S W. U. L. R EV. 281, 287 (1999) (examining research that indicates that the way to
combat stereotypical responses is to develop  conscious self-regulation ).
40. See Aleinikoff, supra note 39, at 1079-80 (discussing how colorblindness
perpetuates racism, and arguing for color-consciousness).
41. See id. at 1062 (arguing that  in order to make progress in ending racial
oppression and racism, our political and moral discourse must move from
colorblindness to color-consciousness ).
42. See Leslie Espinoza & Angela Harris, Afterword: Embracing the Tar-BabyLatCrit
Theory and the Sticky Mess of Race, 85 Cal. L. Rev. 1585, 1606-07 (1997) (using the
metaphor  Tar Baby to capture the frustration of trying to free oneself from the Tar
Baby, but finding oneself only getting stuck further). A pessimistic view of racial
hierarchies might highlight that the more we struggle, the worse it gets; however, for
those with an eschatology for change, resistance may be, in and of itself, the solution.
See generally A LICE WALKER, P OSSESSING THE S ECRET OF JOY (1992).
43. See, e.g., WOODROW M. P ARKER, CONSCIOUSNESS-R AISING: A P RIMER ON
MULTICULTRURAL COUNSELING 1-4 (2d ed. 1998) (suggesting counselors acknowledge
different cultural backgrounds so that they can meet the needs of those when they
counsel, regardless of their race, since the long held belief that traditional
counseling methods are sufficient for all persons is not accurate); Paul P. Pederson,
The Cultural Inclusiveness of Counseling, in COUNSELING A CROSS CULTURES 24 (Paul B.
Pedersen et al. eds., 1981) assuming that mental health psychiatry literature
regarding cultural-bound disorders are made valuable and relevant to counseling
because of the cultural factors that formulate the basic form and structure of
problems; HANDBOOK OF MULTICULTURAL COUNSELING 609-13 app.1 (Joseph G.
Ponterotto et al. eds., 1995) (providing psychologists guidelines in working with
ethnic, linguistic and culturally diverse populations); see also Clemmont E. Vontress,
Racial and Ethnic Barriers in Counseling, in COUNSELING A CROSS CULTURES 42-64 (Paul
Pedersen et al. eds., 1976) (recognizing the need to overcome psychosocial barriers
in therapeutic interactions with racial and ethnic minorities to achieve effective
counseling); UNDERSTANDING AND COUNSELING ETHNIC MINORITIES 19-25 (George
Henderson ed., 1979) (indicating that counselors should encourage personal and
intellectual growth, while assuming responsibility of the psychological welfare, for
their minority counselees by observing and analyzing their history and culture).
44. See Paul R. Tremblay, Interviewing and Counseling Across Cultures: Heuristics and
Biases, 9 CLINICAL L. R EV. 373, 378 (2002).
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do we as lawyers and teachers do with our newly acquired cultural,
racial or ethnic sensitivity? How does it or might it affect our
practice?
So why should lawyers care about cultural competence? I believe it
45
helps us to better serve our clients. Think about the things lawyers
do with clients: information gathering, counseling and decision
46
Communication is necessary to effectuate any of these
making.
lawyering goals. For example, there is much written about the
pattern of linguistics and how much communication differs between
47
women and men.
When a lawyer understands that women may
need room to develop ideas and may need to have a relationship to
know how to express themselves, lawyers can be trained to better
interview their clients.
48
The same principles apply to culturally conscious lawyering. For
49
example, in some cultures it is essential to avoid eye contact; in our

Id.

The task here is to appreciate and respect the differences [between you and]
your clients, but without resorting to stereotypes or stubborn myths about
race, sex, ethnicity and culture. To ignore likely differences in culture is an
invitation to malpractice in counseling; to presume you know what those
differences will be once you know your clients race or sex or cultural
background is an invitation to dehumanize or reify your client, and to
assume generalizations that may not apply to him.

45. See DERALD WING S UE & DAVID S UE, COUNSELING THE CULTURALLY DIFFERENT 7
(2d ed. 1990) (hypothesizing that one of the reasons minority group individuals so
rarely seek help is because services offered are usually antagonistic or inappropriate
to the life experiences of a minority group individual). Consequently, being
conscious of cultural differences will help professionals alter their counseling
methods to tailor them to the needs of minority group individuals. Id. at 8.
46. See, e.g., DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., L AWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED
A PPROACH 25-30 (1991) (providing an overview of the methods and techniques of
client-centered interviewing and counseling); see generally R OBERT M. BASTRESS &
JOSEPH D. HARBAUGH, INTERVIEWING, COUNSELING & N EGOTIATING: S KILLS FOR
EFFECTIVE R EPRESENTATION 4 (1990). Due to growing public concerns regarding
lawyers skills, this text purports to help lawyers develop their interviewing,
counseling, and negotiation skills so that they may effectively represent their clients.
Id.
47. See, e.g., Espinoza, Multi-Identity, supra note 28, at 31 (examining the work of
Robin Laykoff on gender differences in communication). Demonstrating a need for
an array of communication styles, Laykoff analyzes the ways that women view
themselves and that others view women in American culture. Id.
48. See Michelle S. Jacobs, People from the Footnotes: The Missing Element in ClientCentered Counseling, 27 GOLDEN GATE U. L. R EV. 345 (1997) (developing a model for
taking advantage of interdisciplinary work to expand the teaching of effective
interviewing and counseling skills, and noting the significance of culture on clientcounselor interactions); Lucie E. White, The Transformative Potential of Clinical Legal
Education, 35 O SGOODE HALL L.J. 603, 605 (1997) (explaining that a generic
approach to teaching legal skills with  its purported blindness to race and class
subordination, worked to reinforce, rather than reduce, race and class privilege ).
49. See S UE & S UE, supra note 45, at 56 (describing stylistic differences in the way
Whites and Blacks communicate with others). Blacks tend not to make eye contact
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culture, to do so casts doubt on the veracity of the speaker. Often
51
the social role of deference is very important in a culture. It is
unacceptable to challenge a professional and a client will not
disagree or correct information. Other clients may come from
52
cultures that fear authority and bureaucracy.
At times, the whole mode of communication is different. For
example, we had a Haitian client we were representing in an eviction
case. The client was a Creole speaker, and we were using an
interpreter. The student explained to the interpreter that he wanted
to have a direct translation. He wanted everything that he said
directly related to the client and then the clients exact words back to
him. Nevertheless, every time the student would ask a question, such
as,  Do you want to stay in the apartment? , he would hear the
interpreter and the client speak back and forth, with great animation,
for several minutes. Then the interpreter would turn to him and say,
 No. The student attorney did not know what to do. He felt that he
was not understanding the client at all and he was worried that the
client was not getting information from him.
The student decided to do some cultural exploration. He did
some research on different patterns of communication, spoke with
folks in the community, and learned that in Haitian culture, it was
impolite to directly ask or answer a question.53 The pattern of
discourse, he learned is that generally one should tell a story that has
a point, and then the listener responds with another story that is
layered onto the first story, and back and forth until there is
understanding.
What the interpreter was doing was literally
to indicate that they are listening, but Whites do. Id.; see also Tremblay, supra note
44, at 394 (observing that in some Asian cultures avoiding eye contact is a sign of
respect).
50. See Tremblay, supra note 44, at 393 ( Those in the dominant culture
understand a strong, unwavering gaze to indicate honesty, self-assurance, and
comfort. ).
51. See WANDA M. L. L EE, A N INTRODUCTION TO MULTICULTURAL COUNSELING 10413 (1999) (describing the respect for authority in Asian American culture).
52. See, e.g., Jacobs, supra note 48, at 384-91 (noting how Black clients may be
reticent because of their distrust of white professionals ability to understand their
problems or to even help them); see also Steven Weller et al., Fostering Culturally
Responsive Courts: The Case of Family Dispute Resolution for Latinos, 39 F AM. CT. R EV. 185
(2001) (discussing how Latino families have developed different ways of dealing and
interacting with government authority).
53. See generally Jessie M. Colin & Ghislaine Paperwalla, Haitian-Americans (last
visited Feb. 25, 2003) (explaining that although Haitians express themselves
emotionally as a pattern of cultural communication,  uneducated Haitians generally
hide their lack of knowledge to non-Haitians by keeping to themselves, avoiding
conflict, and sometimes projecting a timid air or attitude ), available at http://www.
unix.oit.umass.edu/~efhayes/haitian.htm.
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interpreting. He would take the students pointed question and turn
it into a story, hear out the clients story, and then interpret the story
back to the student attorney as a  yes or  no.
With this
information, the student tried to change his way of approaching
information gathering by using more narrative, open ended
questions. The student was also able to work more effectively with
the interpreter to explain what his needs were in order to prepare
54
the case for court.
55
In addition, decision making has significant cultural components.
In certain cultures, who decides a question is crucial. It may be
56
necessary to obtain involvement of the family. Or it may be crucial
57
to defer to a male family member regarding decisions.
It is
important to remember that in some cultures there is a huge risk to
women if they disturb the cultural pattern that the husband makes all
the decisions. To try to shift this pattern would perhaps put her
58
Battered women are often still in a
relationship in jeopardy.
battering relationship when we are providing them with other kinds
of legal assistance. It is crucial to appreciate their culture. We may
want to empower them by turning to them to make decisions, when
in fact, we are making it impossible for them to obtain assistance.
Cultural knowledge is also central to developing a legal and
59
advocacy strategy for a case. It may be unacceptable for some clients
54. See Amy Bibb & Georges J. Casimir, Haitian Families, in ETHNICITY AND F AMILY
THERAPY 97, 105 (Monica McGoldrick et al. eds., 2d ed. 1996) (describing the family
dynamic, particularly how it reflects a collectivist world view).
55. See, e.g., A NNE F ADIMAN , THE S PIRIT CATCHES Y OU AND Y OU F ALL DOWN : A
HMONG CHILD, HER A MERICAN DOCTORS, AND THE COLLISION OF TWO CULTURES 65
(1997) (describing the dynamics between the medical establishment and Hmong
immigrants in a case involving a child with epilepsy).
And there were so many ways to err! When doctors conferred with a Hmong
family, it was tempting to address the reassuringly Americanized teenaged
girl who wore lipstick and spoke English rather than the old man who
squatted silently in the corner. Yet failing to work within the traditional
Hmong hierarchy, in which males ranked higher than females and old
people higher than young ones, not only insulted the entire family but also
yielded confused results, since the crucial questions had not been directed
toward those who had the power to make the decisions.
Id.
56. See Weller et al., supra note 52, at 191 (noting the importance of collective
decision making because it encourages individuals to overlook their differences and
personal goals in an effort to promote a groups goals).
57. See F ADIMAN , supra note 55, at 65 (identifying a culture where males hold the
decision-making power).
58. See S UE & S UE, supra note 45, at 97-102 (noting the ineffectiveness of therapy
where individuals fail to recognize differences in cultural assimilation).
59. See Kimberly E. OLeary, Using Difference Analysis to Teach Problem-Solving, 4
CLINICAL L. R EV. 65, 66 (1997) (arguing that law students need to be taught to
explore a diverse range of viewpoints rather than focusing solely on options that
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to be depicted to the court in certain ways, or to have certain matters
60
discussed publicly. For example, we have found that the imperative
of not shaming the family may be more important to some of our
61
Asian clients than their own safety. Lawyers must work with clients
to develop plans that reach desired outcomes in culturally acceptable
ways. Again, lawyers should not assume certain cultural themes.
However, if a lawyer has cultural awareness, he or she can explore to
see if it is relevant in this case. We can do this exploration by
developing a narrative understanding of our clients.
C. Using Narrative to be Better Lawyers
1.

What is Narrative?

It is intellectually fascinating to shift perspectives and attempt to
walk in the mindset of someone else. It is even more challenging
when the other is unlike yourself. Of course, we do this all the time.
We watch movies and imagine ourselves as starship warriors,
Cleopatra Queen of the Nile, Priscilla Queen of the Desert, The Last
Emperor, the First Astronaut and even a 1L. We read books and feel
the agony of the last few hundred feet to the top of Everest or the
deceptive simplicity of farm life on 1000 acres. In this way, we are all
familiar with the ability of narrative to bring understanding. Most of
us believe this makes each of us a better person. We have a richer
understanding of the world, a better basis for empathy, and an
opportunity to see how we might change and expand our own actual
experience.
Narrative understanding is different than observation or study. It is
based on identification with character and story that forces the
62
listener to put aside their own points of identity. One experiences
the narrative by getting caught up in the story. By putting aside our
consciousness of self, we may be able to understand people who
perceive the world very differently than we do. Arguably, narrative
seem to make sense from the students own worldview).
60. See S UE & S UE, supra note 45, at 39-40 (emphasizing that some cultures
discourage self-disclosure).
61. See L EE, supra note 51, at 104 (explaining that as part of their cultural norm
of respecting authority, Asian Americans have more of a societal group focus, which
de-emphasizes the importance of individual freedom of choice and expression).
62. See Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. R EV. 971, 982-1012
(1991) (discussing the ways in which feminist narrative can be useful in the legal
context and addressing criticisms of that approach); Mary I. Coombs, Outsider
Scholarship: The Law Review Stories, 63 U. COLO . L. R EV. 683, 695-96 (1992) (noting
that the voice of disempowered groups often expresses itself through narratives and
stories that expose oppression, which is overlooked by the mainstream society).
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may be one of the only ways that we can move beyond the
63
unconscious bonds that dictate the way we perceive the world. For
example, without  Boys Dont Cry I would not have an inkling of
the complicated reality of a transgendered boy. It didnt matter that
I taught gender studies, that I write about outsiders, or that I try to be
multi-culturally sensitive and in tune. It is an experience so different,
so unexplored by me, that I needed narrative to begin
understanding.
On the other hand, we are aware of the limitations of
understanding and knowledge through narrative. No, I do not know
what it really feels like to be caught in a blizzard in the Himalayas, to
be a transgendered teenager in the Midwest, to be a boy in the hood,
or to be a Master of the Universe. And each narrative is only what it
is; it is the experience of one particular individual that may not
represent the experiences of another in a similar situation. For
example, the experience of one particular immigrant coming to El
Norte will not be the experience of all immigrants.
The stories we hear from our clients indicate two things. First,
these stories demonstrate the power of narrative to yield contextual,
cultural, and racial understanding. Second, they indicate the
complicated nature of contextual, cultural, and racial understanding.
The narrative requires that we hold onto the individual story, with all
its unique characteristics, and simultaneously embrace the cultural
context and metamessage of the story. As we lawyer in a way that is
always about our personal, cultural and social history, so too does the
client present a legal situation that is set in a personal context and a
cultural reality.64
2.

Why Narrative?
Developing a factual understanding of a case is always in one sense

63. See Richard Delgado, Colloquy: Mindset and Metaphor, 103 HARV. L. R EV. 1872,
1874 (1990) ( These representations help us explain and deal with the unfamiliar
and troubling by likening them to that which we know. ); Richard Delgado,
Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. R EV. 2411, 2414
(1988) (observing that storytelling,  can open new windows into reality, showing us
that there are possibilities for life other than the ones we live ).
64. See, e.g., JANINE R OBERTS, TALES AND TRANSFORMATIONS: S TORIES IN F AMILIES
AND F AMILY THERAPY 129 (1994) ( It is important to have the possibility of resonation
between personal stories and cultural stories resonation that allows people to see
how their particular experience is intertwined with the political and social history of
their society. ). See generally Vincent Fish, Poststructuralism in Family Therapy:
Interrogating the Narrative/Conversational Mode, 19 J. MARITAL & F AM. THERAPY 221
(1993) (arguing that therapists must be attentive to historical, political and social
context when developing a narrative mode).
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developing a narrative of that piece of the clients life. The lawyers
job is to understand the facts relevant to the legal issue at hand. This
is straightforward when the lawyer is familiar with the legal issues and
his or her clients.
When clients are presented as  others, as those who are outside
the dominant social discourse, developing a narrative is more
challenging. Their stories are often different than the usual legal
narrative. They are tentative, dangerous and imbedded with the
perspective of outsiders to power. In order to serve disempowered
66
clients, we must foster and listen to these stories.
Most of us are both insiders and outsiders. We are both privileged
and oppressed in various aspects of our lives. For example, clinicians
are  outsiders to traditional law teaching. This is not the kind of
outsiderness I am addressing. The oppression I am addressing is the
overarching, historical and current, deeply ingrained, economic and
social power division in our society. The division is reflected in the
direct coercion and repression visited on outsiders to keep them
down. The incidence of torture, slavery, internment, immigration
exclusion or detention, beating, lynching, murder, rape, police
brutality, imprisonment, incest, institutionalization and genocide
demonstrate this direct coercion and repression. It is also manifest in
the indirect control imposed through social rules and mindset,
through fear and a sense of self as inferior.67
Stories allow lawyers and clients to communicate about outsider
experience. When our work is in the mainstream, the usual direct
ways of knowing are available. Our language captures, names and
empowers the dominant experience. For outsiders, stories access
outsider experience using the dominant language. There is an
understanding around the words, allowing the meaning to seep into
our consciousness, that are used.
65. See Clark D. Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients: Thinking about Law as
Language, 87 MICH. L. R EV. 2459, 2461 (1989) ( What the lawyer says is admittedly a
story, shaped and crafted, but it is still true. ); Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their
Lives: Recognizing Client Narrative in Case Theory, 93 MICH. L. R EV. 485, 576 (1994)
(concluding that  lawyer and client narratives must come together to capture the
best of both client and lawyer experience ).
66. See Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations,
22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. R EV. 323, 324-26 (1987) (arguing that victims of racial
discrimination have distinct normative insights); Margaret E. Montoya, Máscaras,
Trenzas, y Greñas: Un/Masking the Self While Un/Braiding Latina Stories and Legal
Discourse, 17 HARV. WOMEN S L.J. 185, 210-15 (1994) (noting that for disempowered
people, storytelling is a discursive technique for resisting cultural and linguistic
domination through personal and collective redefinition).
67. See generally Espinoza & Harris, supra note 42, at 1610 (discussing the creation
of a social hierarchy through racism, capitalism, sexism, colonialism, misogeny,
homophobia, poverty, and other systems of oppression).
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Why do we need stories to understand? For the oppressed, there is
danger in speaking their experience. For example, battered women
often cannot speak for fear of their batterer. But their fear is larger
than the immediate situation. There is an implicit understanding
that to speak is to threaten the larger social order. Our society may
sensationalize domestic assault, but it does not want to acknowledge
that interpersonal relationships are structured along power lines.
Women are subservient and are often kept in that condition by brute
force. For the privileged, there is danger in hearing the experience
of the oppressed. Once we  see, feel and understand oppression,
once we feel it, once we know it, we are confronted with the moral
question of what we are going to do about it. It is difficult to hear the
voices of pain and still feel self-congratulatory about our  good
work.
3.

Using Narrative to Break Stereotypes

Earlier I wrote of a case in which we were representing a woman
who was seeking extension of a restraining order. The years of abuse
she experienced were not easy for her to discuss with us. We worked
to find other ways for her to be comfortable communicating with us.
We were thinking of the gender communication issues and her
experience as a woman trying to develop a language to talk about her
horrendous experiences.
We did not think or speak about race. Race did not seem to be
impacting our communication, so we did not address it in any
68
context. Did I mention that our client is African American? When I
spoke of the client before, did you see her as White, Latina, Black, or
Asian? Does it matter? Now that you know she is Black, would race
be relevant if you were lawyering this case? Exactly how did we know
69
she is African American, that she is Black? Is it more important to
68. See BETH E. R ICHIE, COMPELLED TO CRIME: THE GENDER ENTRAPMENT OF
BATTERED BLACK WOMEN 63-65 (1996) (discussing the importance of awareness of
race in working with battered women of color); Jenny Rivera, Domestic Violence Against
Latinas by Latino Males: An Analysis of Race, National Origin, and Gender Differentials, 14
B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 231, 242-51 (1994) (addressing issues in domestic violence
enforcement strategies facing Latinas). See generally Nilda Rimonte, A Question of
Culture: Cultural Approval of Violence Against Women in the Pacific-Asian Community and
the Cultural Defense, 43 S TAN . L. R EV. 1311 (1991) (discussing ways that culture can
justify violence against women).
69. See Neil Gotanda, A Critique of Our Constitution In Color-Blind, 44 S TAN . L.
R EV. 2, 24 (1991) (explaining the  one drop of blood rule in American racial
classification).
American racial classifications follow two formal rules: 1) Rule of
recognition: Any person whose Black-African ancestry is visible is Black. 2)
Rule of descent: (a) Any person with a known trace of African ancestry is
Black, notwithstanding that persons visual appearance; or, stated differently,
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explore race if a client has unambiguous racial markers such as
70
skin color, hair texture, accent, eye shape, syntax, or cultural style?
Like the discussion about my nephews basketball coach, it was hard
not to  notice race, but hard to know what to do about race.
Nevertheless, I thought I understood this case, as did the student
attorney.
There were videotapes in our heads.
We had a
prepackaged story about women and the men who batter them. We
now needed to cast our client as one of the  worthy characters in
our formulaic story. The completed  story worked to give us a
theory of the case, to help us to present the right  videotape to the
judge. The judge, of course, would have a videotape running in his
head, too.
The day we went to court to extend the restraining order, we met
our clients husband. He is white. Does it make a difference? I think
so. After the hearing, the student attorney and I discussed the issue
of race in the case. I had to raise it because I had to acknowledge my
own racism before we could have an open discussion. The student is
white, I am Latina. We both assumed our clients husband would be
African American. We both noticed how the otherwise busy and
bored courtroom became suddenly focused when our case was
called and the interracial couple was before the court. We both
had to acknowledge that we were shaken that her husband was white.
Without even being conscious of it, we both had assumed that the
judge would be more likely to restrain a black man than a white man.
71
Without even thinking about it, we had structured the cultural
stereotype of the violent, over-sexed black man into our vision of the
72
73
case. We were using racism for strategic advantage.
Id.

(b) the offspring of a Black and a white is Black.

70. See generally Taunya Lovell Banks, Colorism: A Darker Shade of Pale, 47 UCLA L.
R EV. 1705 (2000) (arguing that skin-tone discrimination constitutes a form of race
discrimination).
71. See Armour, supra note 39, at 283-85 ( [I]t is important to understand the
ubiquitous tendency of fact finders and other decisionmakers to unconsciously
discriminate against members of stereotyped groups. . . . Understanding the
cognitive underpinnings of habits sheds light on the mechanism by which wellintentioned people may routinely discriminate against blacks and members of other
stereotyped groups. ).
72. See generally Anthony Paul Farley, The Black Body as Fetish Object, 76 O R. L. R EV.
457 (1997) (noting the importance of violent and sexualized, racist imagery to
whites); W. F ITZHUGH BRUNDAGE, L YNCHING IN THE N EW S OUTH: GEORGIA AND
V IRGINIA, 1880-1930 5 (August Meier & John H. Bracey eds., 1993) (1959) (providing
a historical perspective on the way Black men have been debased); Jennifer Wriggins,
Rape, Racism, and the Law, 6 HARV. WOMEN S L.J. 103 (1983) (critiquing the myth of
Black men raping White women).
73. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Lynching Ethics: Toward a Theory of Racialized Defenses, 95
MICH. L. R EV. 1063, 1074-84 (1997) (examining the criminal defense  stories
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CONCLUSION
The question remains: should we have asked our client about her
husbands race? Should we ask all clients about race? You dont have
to practice long in the court systems to know that it matters.74 Clients
of color are more often seen as welfare moms, drug users or violent
individuals. I do not believe there is a universal answer. I think we
work with stories of other cultures to learn more about their styles of
communication, values and structures. We also work with our own
stories of lawyering for clients from culturally diverse populations.
What I do think is clear is that when we limit narrative, we are at
risk of missing important information and understanding our client.
More importantly, when we limit narrative we miss important
information about ourselves. We may find that we have foreclosed
discourse.75 We may find that we have done so because we, the
lawyers, are unconsciously seeking litigation advantage by operating
from a base and morally reprehensible posture of power. The power
of narrative is that it allows for a different kind of knowledge. It
invites us to see the world in a way that is not comfortable, but that is
honest.

utilized in white-on-black racially incited violence, and demonstrating their
concordance with the historical oppression of blacks).
74. See HIROSHI F UKURAI ET AL., R ACE AND THE JURY: R ACIAL DISENFRANCHISEMENT
AND THE S EARCH FOR JUSTICE 34 (James Alan Fox & Joseph Weis eds., 1993) ( [L]egal
and judicial structures continuously reproduce, maintain, and perpetuate the
subordination of racial and ethnic minorities. ); see, e.g., Paul Butler, Racially Based
Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 Y ALE L.J. 677, 679-80
(1995) (stating that the criminal justice system is so racially biased that it should be
dismantled, arguing that African-Americans ought to be punished by AfricanAmerican juries, and that racially based jury nullification is sometimes a good thing).
See generally Sheri Lynn Johnson, Unconscious Racism and the Criminal Law, 73 CORNELL
L. R EV. 1016 (1988) (discussing the failure of the criminal justice system to consider
the effects of unconscious racism).
75. See Jodi David Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal Decisionmakers
Break the Prejudice Habit, 83 CAL. L. R EV. 733, 772 (1995) (noting how our unguarded
responses tend to be prejudiced against Blacks and other minority groups, but how
through a  deeper understanding of the habitual nature of our responses to
stereotyped groups, we can develop  strategies for helping people inhibit their
habitual and activate their endorsed responses to these groups ).
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